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1. INTRODUCTION
According to the historical definition of philosophy among Western philosophers
from Hegel to his anti-historical critics Levinas, Derrida, and Rorty, non-Western
peoples have many intellectual practices but in a crucial sense they lack “philoso-
phy.” This absence meant for Hegel the want of a non-pictorial and abstract, cog-
nitive, conceptual thinking; for later thinkers such as Levinas, Derrida, and
Rorty—following a line of thinking in Heidegger that the “other beginning” can
only arise in confrontation with the first Greek beginning—it concerns the ques-
tion of a Greek origin that they seek to question and decenter that nevertheless
remains the source of all that can be properly called philosophy.
Even the pluralizing of this origin in marking the difference between Athens
and Jerusalem, by distinguishing Greek rationality and Jewish prophetic justice,
deepens the privilege. Levinas could accordingly remark in an interview: “I always
say—but under my breath—that the Bible and the Greeks present the only serious
issues in human life; everything else is dancing.”2 Levinas and Hegel come to an
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Das Vergangene ist nicht tot; es ist nicht einmal vergangen.
Wir trennen es von uns ab und stellen uns fremd.
Christa Wolf 1
Western philosophy has been defined through the exclusion of non-Western forms of thought as non-philo-
sophical. In this paper, I place the notion of what is “properly” philosophy into question by contrasting the
essence/appearance paradigm governing Western metaphysics and its deconstructive critics with the more
fluid, dynamic, and participatory forms of encountering and performatively enacting the world that are ar-
ticulated in Chinese thinking and made apparent in Chinese painting. In this hermeneutical contrast, West-
ern and Chinese thinking themselves are interpeted as co-relational rather than as discrete, mutually
indifferent or ethnocentrically nativist traditions.
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agreement that what is not properly philosophy, or in Levinas’s case the Jewish
other of philosophy, remains mere sensuousness and lacks the seriousness of the
concept. The problematic character of metaphysics remains an exclusively philo-
sophical and thus Western concern for the deconstructive critics of the Western
philosophical tradition such as Derrida and Rorty whose challenges to the Western
canon continue to privilege it.3
The issue here cannot only be one of transference, inheritance, and lineage, as
Arabic and Islamic philosophy deeply relies on and is indebted to the heritage of
Plato and Aristotle. Nonetheless, beyond the unphilosophical assertion of the eth-
nic and racial origins of philosophy,—one might examine the question “philoso-
phically” by inquiring into what intellectual forms would differentiate Western
and non-Western thought. The answer, particularly in the context of the contrast
between Western philosophy and Chinese thinking, often appeals to (1) the dis-
tinction between reality and appearance and (2) the—not unrelated—priority of
the logical as the assertion of a form independent of all content. The formalism of
reason ascends beyond all sensuousness and materiality just as reality purportedly
transcends the flowing change and inconstancy of appearance and phenomenon.
2. A CHINESE PAINTING
In a recent work, T. Minh-Ha Trinh describes the practices of traditional Chinese
painting and how they, “rather than seeking resemblance with nature’s outward
appearance (xing形), involve the movement of its becomingness.”4 To take one
example, for the poet and painter Wang Wei 王維 (699–759), “paintings, in their
language of brush, form and symbol, should inscribe the ever-changing processes
of nature.”5 Wang Wei’s flow of the brush in painting a landscape situated between
earth and sky, in which the painter is inevitably a participant, echoes the shifting
lines of the Yijing 易經 (Classic of Changes) and the interpreter’s integral partici-
pation in the generative process of meaning-formation.6
I discuss these issues in further detail in E. S. Nelson: “The Yijing and Philosophy: From Leibniz to
Derrida”. In: Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38:3, September 2011, pp. 377–396. Levinas and Derrida’s
Eurocentric vision is extended in R. Gasché: Europe, or the Infinite Task: A Study of a Philosophical
Concept. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009, and P. Nemo: What Is the West? Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press 2006.
T. Minh-Ha Trinh: Elsewhere, Within Here: Immigration, Refugeeism and the Boundary Event. London:
Routledge 2011, p. 69.
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Picture One: An Example of Wang Wei style. Wang Shimin (王時敏, 1592–1680), After Wang Wei’s
“Clearing of Rivers and Mountains after Snow” (仿王維江山雪霽). Hanging scroll, ink and colors on
paper, 133.7 x 60 cm, National Palace Museum, Taipei.7
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In this work of ink and color on paper, the painter does not aim at imitatively
copying the real and producing “the appearance of reality” as if there could be a
reproductive or representational correspondence between the seeing and the seen.
Chinese painting does not occur according to the Platonic conception of ideas.
Nor does it improperly create a semblance or shadow of the real, a reification of
the invisible in the visible, which Levinas depicts—redoubling despite himself the
ontological distinction of appearance and essence in a religious-ethical language—
as idolatry in his essay “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948).8 Levinas adopts a language
that denigrates “appearance” as seductive semblance, as he further warns us of “the
charm of sorcery, the appearance in the very heart of the real, the dissolution of
reality.”9 The Luciferian play of appearances is a deceptive shadowing of reality
that does not recognize itself as deception and precludes the ethical obligation that
can only be revealed in the transcendence of the face-to-face encounter.10
The experience of the natural world in Wang Shimin’s painting, which is expe-
rientially enacted in creative response to his world and the traditions of response
that orient it, is not a mere “landscape” for the detached seer. It does not seek to
reproduce “the real” and thus denigrate it in idolatry. The Chinese painter does
not create like God ex nihilo nor recreate what is already predetermined by that
creation risking betraying its glory and height. It is neither “Greek” nor “Jewish”
—to the extent that these categories can be represented as respectively Platonic
and Levinasian—in the sense of detached rational contemplation or a confronta-
tion with the paganism of finite sensuous nature for the sake of ethical infinity.11
Instead, the Chinese painter in this case co-mediates and co-creates a world.
The painter participates in the very generativities of natural processes by enact-
ing them for her or himself. This is not participation in the sense of an irrational
absorption in the phenomena without reflection or criticism. This participation
encompasses reflection, sensibility, and affectivity in being responsive from out of
and toward one’s environing world and in the creative generative co-formation of
self and world.
Description and image from: http://www.chinaonlinemuseum.com/painting-wang-shimin-clearing-
after-snow.php [accessed 1 May 2013].
E. Lévinas: Collected Philosophical Papers. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff 1987, pp. 1–13.
Id.: Nine Talmudic Readings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990, p. 143.
Id.: Otherwise Than Being: Or, Beyond Essence. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991, p. 123.
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3. THE LOGIC OF APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
AND THE YIJING
Contemporary proponents of the genuineness of non-Western varieties of philos-
ophy have noted the key role of the distinction between essential reality and shad-
owy appearance in debates over their possibility. In the case of Chinese thought,
Roger Ames has noted that the prevalent traditional “East Asian world view [does]
not begin from the dualistic ‘two-world’ reality/appearance distinction familiar in
classical Greek metaphysics.”12 Ames is correct to maintain that early Chinese 
thinking does not involve the otherworldly transcendence typical of the Greco-
Judaic-Christian tradition. Nor does early Chinese thought, however, begin in the
monistic immanence of a speculative totality that is likewise characteristic of West-
ern philosophy and critiqued by advocates such as Kierkegaard and Levinas of a
singularity that escapes the universal.
Chinese philosophical thought, particularly the thinking informed by early 
Daoism and the Confucian reception of the Yijing, is an affective and reflective
response to the natural, social, and individual world. Through individual and social
sensibility and dialogical exchange, the world is revealed as immanent yet trans-
formative (internally self-generating and dynamically changing in movement), in-
dividual yet contextual (each particular is itself in relation to each other particular
being itself ).13
One of the primary paradigms for Chinese cultural and intellectual traditions
is a work that began as divination and became a guide to the natural world and
cosmos, the Yijing. The Yijing was, according to the ancient sages, inspired by the
processes of nature themselves and imitates them not as a semblance reflecting a
fixed predetermined reality but as changing configurations and symbols that par-
ticipate in the flowing transformative processes of nature. The ancient sages, it is
said, “were able to survey all phenomena under heaven and, considering their
forms and appearances, ‘symbolized’ (xiang像) things and their proper attributes.
These were called ‘symbols’ (xiang).”14 The word xiang here can mean: configura-
tion, figure, image, or symbol.15
According to the contemporary Chinese philosopher Chung-ying Cheng, Chi-
nese thought—beginning with the Yijing—does not require a bifurcated division
between reality and appearance. Rather, Chinese thought holds that reality simply
R. Ames: “East Asian Philosophy”. In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 7, ed. by E. Craig,
London: Routledge 1998, p. 193.
I explore this tendency in early Daoism in relation to Kant’s Critique of Judgment. In: E. S. Nelson:
“Kant and China: Aesthetics, Race, and Nature”. In: Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2011–4), pp.
509–525.
R. F. Campany: “Xunzi and Durkheim as Theorists of Ritual Practice”. In: Discourse and Practice,
ed. by F. Reynolds / D. Tracy, Albany: State University of New York Press 1992, p. 206.  






consists in “the incessant and constant change of all things.”16 It does not abstract
and reify a form separated from the dynamic logic of the plural relations of par-
ticulars for which the Yijing presents multiple—at least sixty four—interpretive
models. This onto-hermeneutics, as Cheng designates the logic of the Yijing-tra-
dition, is a temporal one. Cheng maintains that the difference between Western
and Chinese philosophy reflects two distinct experiences of time: “In separating
reality from appearance … the ancient Greeks sought the immutable and unmoved
as the essence of the real and the objective. In contrast, the ancient Chinese from
the very beginning recognized and accepted change and transformation as 
irreducible attributes of the world.”17
Do the Chinese then have no sense of the distinction between semblance and
reality? Does Chinese thought entail drifting along in a “floating world” of phe-
nomena without form and measure? Of course not; the manifold shifting patterns
of reality and multiple hermeneutical paradigms of the Yijing allow for the recog-
nition of deception and of the tension and difference between external semblance
and internal truth, as in the Mandarin saying biǎo lǐ bù yī表里不一. Accordingly,
to mention one example, hexagram 23, Bo 剝 (splitting apart or peeling), of the
Yijing speaks of separating the essential from the apparent. This differentiation of
appearance and reality is, however, only one moment of the generative movement
of things that is traced and indicated through the models of the Yijing. This mo-
ment is recognized alongside other moments. Therefore, it cannot establish an un-
changing constant essence underlying changing appearances. To this extent, truth
and knowledge do not require the reification of this bifurcation provided that they
can be distinguished when appropriate.
Furthermore, the word xing 形 that is often translated as “appearance,” also
means shape, form, figure, and body. In this context, xing should be understood
not merely as a becoming visible or the semblance of the real, as an idol or shadow
of reality, but as the material manifestation that is reality itself. We can note here
once again the variance between the visible as an arena for a detached and inde-
pendent observer, who seeks to neutrally contemplate and recreate a pregiven re-
ality in art or in ideas, and the visible as an interactive field for an involved and
moved participant in the flows and forces of reality.
The qualitative experientially-rooted participant perspective becomes visible in
Chinese art and philosophy. Yet just as Chinese art can exist in distinction from
Greek art, in a resonating non-identity without exclusion or assimilation, Chinese
philosophy can be—to think with and against Heidegger—an “other beginning”
Chung-ying Cheng: “Onto-Hermeneutical Vision and Analytic Discourse: Interpretation and Re-
construction in Chinese Philosophy”. In: Two Roads to Wisdom?: Chinese and Analytic Philosophical
Traditions, ed. by Bo Mou, Chicago: Open Court 2001, p. 94.
Id.: “The Origins of Chinese Philosophy”. In: Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, ed. by B.
Carr / I. Mahalingam, London: Routledge 1997, p. 452.
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in confrontation with its “first” Greek beginning.18 In the formation of the relation
between the two beginnings, there is room for both boundless reversal and a trans-
versal. Based on the correlational transformational thinking of the Yijing, there
can be no absolute difference between philosophy and non-philosophy or one be-
tween West and East.
4. CONCLUSION
In his commentary on the Yijing, Wang Bi 王弼 remarked:
The language twists and turns but hits the mark. (Change and transformation
lack any consistency, so no definite paradigms can be made for them. This is
why the text says: “The language twists and turns but hits the mark”).19
There is no discernible underlying constancy that could serve as the basis of one
definitive paradigm or model of the myriad things. Thoughts and words must
twist and turn in how they encounter the myriad things and in that moment re-
spond opportunely and appropriately, as the myriad things themselves twist and
turn. Timing, the moments when words and things encounter each other and hit
the mark in the midst of their transformations, is more specific to reality than its
reification through the projection of a fixed and static form or essence. Reality is
encountered and experienced in and as change. The multiple “appearances” of the
real call for the ongoing co-relation of multiple orientating perspectives and mod-
els, as seen in the forms and images of the Yijing and their numerous variations
and combinations.
In the philosophy of Wang Bi, these moments can be traced from their incip-
ience to their occurrence. The Yijing then cannot be described as providing isolated
metaphysical truths or basic constitutive elements of a hidden essential reality be-
hind this apparent empirical reality. There are not two distinct worlds, nor one
unchanging monistic world order. A world-nexus of myriad differences in relation
is indicated in the dialectical generative logic of the Yijing. In the co-relational ap-
proach to transformational reality, the numerous models and examples indicated
in the Yijing are opportunities for self-reflection and self-cultivation. The Yijing is
On Heidegger’s first and other beginning and early Chinese thinking, see my articles: “Responding
to Heaven and Earth: Daoism, Heidegger and Ecology”. In: Environmental Philosophy Vol. 1
(2004–2), pp. 65–74; “Heidegger, Misch, and the Origins of Philosophy”. In: Journal of Chinese
Philosophy 39, Supplemental Issue, 2012.
Wang Bi / R. J. Lynn: The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as interpreted by Wang
Bi. New York: Columbia University Press 2004, p. 87.
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in a sense formally indicative of the concrete empirical multiplicities that are en-
countered and engaged in one manner or another.
The Tang dynasty poet and philosopher Liu Yuxi 劉禹錫 (772–84) accordingly
commented that: “The ideal terrain of poetry rises beyond and without images”;
and “The Yijing comes from something beyond appearance, beyond image.”20 We
have seen in this paper how the non-duality of reality and appearance can become
evident though the broader context of reality that immanently generates itself from
within. Yet doesn’t this leave us tied to the pictorial not purely conceptual thinking
that Hegel and Derrida associate with the Chinese language? It is important to
note that the painter, the poet, and the interpreter of the Yijing do not prioritize
the ocularcentric image that seduces and absorbs pure seeing nor merely rely on
the pictorial traces of reality.
The disclosive event of truth is deeply personal as well as cosmological in this
Chinese context. It exceeds the pictorial conceptualization of reality, as there is in-
evitably the spoken word and what is indicated through image and sound in Chi-
nese languages. The classical Chinese language is not a snapshot or intuition of
the real as both its critics and naïve acolytes from Hegel to Ezra Pound have con-
tended. It is a hermeneutics tracing and articulating the mediations of sound,
image, materiality, and energy. It does not only passively follow the flow of things
and their dictation; it can responsively and co-generatively participate in the be-
coming, change, and flow of the world itself.
Translations from Xiaodong Bai: The Tang Concept of Yijing and the Tang Regulated Verse 
(dissertation).
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